that's what I can't tell." As if such acts of speech were clues to the truth of speech itself.
34.
They are confused, those who would appropriate Dylan or Wittgensteinwere there ever two more similar men?-, passing them off as poets?
35.
What now? What new? All these words turning in on themselves like the concentric layers of an onion.
36.
What does it mean: "saw fit"?
37.
Poetry is a specific form of behavior.
38.
But test it against other forms. Is it more like a drunkenness than filling out an absentee ballot? Is there any value in knowing the answer to this question?
39.
Winter wakens thought, much as summer prods recollection. Ought poetry to be a condition of the seasons?
40.
What any of us eventually tries-to arrive at some form of "bad" writing (e.g. 31-34?) that would be one form of "good" poetry. Only when you achieve this will you be able to define what it is.
41.
Speech only tells you the speaker.
42.
Analogies between poetry and painting end up equating page and canvas.
Is there any use in such fiction?
43.
Or take the so-called normal tongue and shift each term in a subtle way. Is this speech made new or mere decoration?
44.
Poets of the syntagmeme, poets of the paradigm.
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45.
The word in the world.
46.
Formal perception: that this section, because of the brevity of the foregoing two, should be extensive, commenting, probing, making not aphorisms but fine distinctions, one sentence perhaps of a modular design, verbs in many clauses like small houses sketched into the mountainsides of a grand Chinese landscape, noting to the mind as it passes the gears and hinges of the design, how from the paradigm "large, huge, vast, great, grand," the term was chosen, by rhyme, anticipate "landscape," time itself signaled by the repetition.
47.
Have we come so very far since Sterne or Pope?
48.
Language as a medium attracts me because I equate it with that element of consciousness which I take to be intrinsically human. Painting or music, say, might also directly involve the senses, but by ordering external situations to provoke specific (or general) responses. Do I fictionalize the page as form not to consider it as simply another manifestation of such "objective" fact? I have known writers who thought they could make the page disappear.
49.
Everything you hear in your head, heart, whole body, when you read this, is what this is.
50. Ugliness v. banality. Both, finally, are attractive.
51.
Time is one axis. Often I want to draw it out, to make it felt, a thing so slow that slight alterations (long v. short syllables, etc., clusters of alliteration . . .) magnify, not line (or breath) but pulse, the blood in the muscle. 
67.
By the very act of naming -The Chinese Notebook-one enters into a process as into a contract. Yet each section, such as this, needs to be invented, does not automatically follow from specific prior statements. However, that too could be the case.
68.
I have never seen a theory of poetry that adequately included a sub-theory of choice.
69.
There is also the question of work rhythms and habits. When I was a boy, after each dinner I would place the family typewriter-it was ancient and heavyatop the kitchen table, typing or writing furiously-it was almost automatic writing-until it was time to go to bed. Later, married, I still wrote in the evening, as though unable to begin until each day's information reached a certain threshold which I could gauge by fatigue. All throughout these years, I could not work on a given piece beyond one sitting-a condition I attributed to my attention span-, although on occasion "one sitting" could extend to 48 hours. Since then there has been a shift. I have lately been writing in notebooks, over extended periods (in one instance, five months), and in the morning, often before breakfast and at times before dawn. Rather than the fatigue of digested sense data, the state of mind I 
92.
Perhaps as a means of containing meaning outside of the gallery system, the visual arts have entered into a period where the art itself exists in a dialectic, in the exchange between worker, critic and worker. Writing stands in a different historical context. Fiction exists in relation to a publishing system, poetry to an academic one.
93.
At Berkeley, when I was a student, graduate students in the English Department liked to think of themselves as "specialized readers."
94.
What makes me think that form exists?
95.
One possibility is my ability to "duplicate" or represent it. As a child, I
could fill in a drawing as tho it and color existed.
96. I want these words to fill the spaces poems leave. 
115.
A hill with two peaks, or two hills. If I grant that the language alters one's perception, and if it follows naturally that, depending on which perception one "chooses," one acts differently, becomes used to different paths, thinks of certain people as neighbors and others not, and that such acts collectively will alter the hill (e.g., one peak becomes middle-class, residential, while the other slips into ghettohood later to be cleared off for further "development" which might include lev- 120. Only esthetic consistency constitutes content (Yates' proposition regarding music). Applied to writing one arrives at the possibility of a "meaningful" poetry as the sum of "meaningless" poems.
121.
But consistency demands a perception of time. Thus, if we accept the proposition, we tacitly approve some definition of poetry as a specific time construct.
122.
There is no direction. There is only distance.
123.
What is the creative role of confusion in any work?
124. At times, my own name is simply a gathering of letters. Very distant.
125.
Words relate to the referred world much the way each point in a line can be said to describe a curve. 133. "Post-syntactical" implies that syntax was a historical period of language, not a condition inherent in it. Rather than seeing language as a universe whose total set cannot be dealt with until all its conditions are brought into play, this designation opts for an easy and incorrect solution. Occasionally, it has been used in such a fashion as to assert some sort of competition with "syntactical" writing, with the supposedly-obvious presumption that, being later in language's various conditions, it is more advanced. Such a view distorts the intentions and functions of abandoning syntactical and even paratactical modes.
Terms, out of context, inevitably expand and develop enlarged inner con-
the chinese notebook ron silliman ditions, the large field of the miniaturists.
E i g n e r 's work, for example. The early writings resemble a late
Williams/early Olson mode, discursive syntax, which becomes in later works increasingly a cryptic notation until now often words in a work will float in an intuitive vocabulary-space, their inner complexities expanded so that words are used like the formal elements in abstract art.
136.
To move away from the individualist stance in writing I first began to choose vocabularies for poems from language sources that were not my own, science texts, etc. Then I began to develop forms which opt away from the melodic dominant line of the past several decades, using formal analogies taken from certain Balinese and African percussive and ensemble musics, as well as that of Steve Reich.
137.
The concept that the poem "expresses" the poet, vocally or otherwise, is at one with the whole body of thought identified as Capitalist Imperialism.
138.
If poetry is to be perfect, it cannot be all-knowing. If it is to be all-knowing, it cannot be perfect.
139.
I began writing seriously a decade ago and was slow to learn. For years I was awkward, sloppy, given to overstatement, the sentimental image, the theatrical resolution. Yet, subtracting these, I am amazed at the elements, all formal and/or conceptual, which have remained constants. It is those who tell me who I am.
140.
The presumption of the logical positivists that "the relation between language and philosophy is closer than, as well as essentially different from, that between language and any other discipline," would upset most poets. Three answers seem possible: (1) the logical positivists are wrong, (2) poetry and philosophy are quite similar and perhaps ought to be considered different branches of a larger category, (3) poetry is not a discipline, at least in the sense of the special definition of the logical positivists. I reject the third alternative as not being true for Certain structural characteristics such as line, stanza, etc. are not always present.
Here is where one gets into Davenport's position regarding Ronald Johnson, to say that one is a poet who has written no poems, per se.
154.
Performance as a form is only that. As always, the intention of the creator defines the state in which the work is most wholly itself, so that it is possible that a talking piece, say, could be said to be a poem. But formally its ties are closer to other arts than to the tradition of poetry. I have, in the last year, heard talking pieces that were proposed as poetry, as music and as sculpture. Each, in all major respects, resembled the late period of Lenny Bruce or perhaps Dick Cavett. The form of the talking piece, its tradition, was always stronger than the asserted definition. Nor is the talking piece the only nontraditional (if, in fact, it is that at all) mode to run into this problem. Some of the visualists, e.g., Kostelanetz, have utithe chinese notebook ron silliman lized film for their poems, but the poem is readily lost in this transfer. What one experiences in its presence is the fact of film.
155. Why did I write "As always, the intention of the creator defines the state in which the work is most wholly itself"? Because it is here and here only where one can "fix" a work into a given state (idea, projective process, text, affective process, impression), an act which is required, absolutely, before one can place the work in relation to others, only after which can one make judgments.
156.
What if I told you I did not really believe this to be a poem? What if I told you I did?
157.
Periodically one hears that definitions are unimportant, or, and this implicitly is more damning, "not interesting." I reject this, taking all language events to be definitions or, if you will, propositions.
158. I find myself not only in the position of arguing that all language acts are definitions and that they nonetheless are not essentially referential, but also that this is not a case specifically limited to an "ideal" or "special" language (such as one might argue poetry to be), but is general, applicable to all.
159.
If, at this point, I was to insert 120 rhymed couplets, would it cause definitions to change?
160. Lippard (Changing, p. 206) argues against a need for a "humanistic" visual arts, but makes an exception for literature, which "as a verbal medium, demands a verbal response." One wonders what, precisely, is meant by that? Is it simply a question of referentiality posed in vague terms? Or does it mean, as I suspect she intended it to, that language, like photography, is an ultimately captive medium? If so, is the assertion correct? It is not.
161.
It becomes increasingly clear that the referential origin of language and its syntactical (or linguistic, or relational) meaning is the contradiction (if it is one) the chinese notebook ron silliman that is to be understood if we are to accept a poetics of autonomous language.
162.
If I could make an irrefutable argument that non-referential langauge does exist (besides, that is, those special categories, such as prepositions or determiners), would I include this in it? Of course I would.
163.
What you read is what you read.
164.
Make a note in some other place, then transfer it here. Is it the same note?
165. I want form to be perceivable but not consequent to referred meaning.
Rather, it should serve to move that element to the fore-or backbrain at will.
166.
Form that is an extension of referred meaning stresses that meaning's relation to the individual, voice or image as extension of self, emphasizes one's separateness from others. What I want, instead, is recognition of our connectedness.
167.
A writing which is all work, technical procedure, say a poem derived from a specific formula, is of interest for this fact alone.
168.
Words in a text like states on a map: meaning is commerce.
169.
One type of criticism would simply describe the formal features of any given work, demonstrate its orderliness with the implicit purpose of, from this, deducing the work's intention. A comparison, then, of the intention to the work (and, secondarily, to other works of identical or similar intention), would provide grounds for a judgment.
170.
Is it possible for a work to conceal its intention?
171.
But if the intention is always to be arrived at deductively, will not the work always be equal to it? Would we be able to recognize a work which had not met the writer's original intention?
172.
Perhaps this poem could be said to be an example of the condition described in 171.
173.
Is it possible for intentions to be judged, good or malevolent, right or otherwise? This brings us into the realm of political and ethical distinctions?
174.
In recent years, criticism has played a dynamic role in the evolution of the visual arts, but not in writing. Theory, much of it unsound, even mystical, on the part of writers, has had more impact. A possible explanation: criticism is applied theory, useful only if it is rigorous in its application, which has been impossible given the loose and vague standards characteristic of so much recent writing, while theory can be used suggestively, which it has been regardless of the mystifications present.
175.
A poem written in pen could never have been written in pencil.
176.
When I was younger, I was so habituated to the typewriter as a tool and to the typewritten page as a space, that, even when I worked from notebooks, the poems transposed back into a typewritten text tended to perfectly fill the page.
177.
Deliberately determining the way one writes, determines much of what will be written.
178.
If I were to publish only parts of this, sections, it would alter the total proposition.
179.
How far will anything extend? Hire dancers dressed as security personnel to walk about an otherwise empty museum, then admit the public. 223. This is it.
